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Abstract. A major division among ontologists has always been the one between those who believe that all entities are 
particular, and those who believe that at least some entities are universal. I find myself with the latter, and in this 
paper I offer part of the reasons why this is so. More precisely, I offer a reason why we ought to reject tropism, due to 
the failure of this view to account for the similarities we experience among entities. In the paper, two tentative 
accounts are considered and rejected: one postulating the existence of a relation of primitive resemblance; the other 
denying the existence of any similarity. 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
A major division among ontologists has always been the one between those who believe that all entities 
are particular, and those who believe that at least some entities are universal. I find myself with the latter, 
and in this paper I offer part of the reasons why this is so. More precisely, I offer my reasons why we 
ought to reject tropism, due to the failure of this view to account for the similarities we experience among 
entities. (The rest of the reasons, that I shall not address here, would involve a criticism of nominalism 
and a theory of universals.) 
Although the division among particular and universal entities is widely accepted, it is remarkable 
that, as of nowadays, there is large disagreement as to how such distinction ought to be explained.1 For 
present purposes, I will assume that particular entities are those that do not repeat, in space or in time; 
every other entity that is capable of repeating is, thus, universal. I will leave unaddressed how 
repeatability ought to be explained. 
Trope theorists (or, briefly, tropists) believe that all entities are particular, and that they have what I 
shall call a qualitative character; that is, for those philosophers each particular entity contributes to 
establish the kind of world we live in: the electrical charges we find at different regions, the gravitational 
forces, the solidity of some regions, the colors we experience, and so on. In other words, tropism can be 
defined as the view according to which: 
  
Tropism: All denizens of reality are unrepeatable and each has a determinate qualitative aspect.2  
 
                                                 
1 See, for example, the recent [McBride 1998], [McBride 2004], [McBride 2005], the discussion in [Westerhoff 2005], and the 
more classic discussion of the topic contained in [Strawson 1954], [Strawson 1959], and [Strawson 1974]. 
2 This view, featuring among its supporters some first-class philosophers such as Locke, has more recently found the favor of 
several authors. A classical recent account is [Campbell 1990]. For a map of the various positions within contemporary trope 
theory, see [Bacon 2002]. 
For a tropist, ordinary properties, such as "redness," are construed as similarity 
classes/sets/mereological sums of unrepeatable qualities.3 Redness is the class/set/mereological sum of 
all tropes of redness. (Individuals are also construed as classes/sets/mereological sums of tropes; but, 
unlike ordinary properties, individuals are classes/sets/mereological sums of compresent tropes, where 
the compresence relation can be further analyzed, for instance, in terms of joint action or spatio-temporal 
proximity.) Clearly, however, such definition is not explanatory. When is a trope a trope of redness, as 
opposed to a trope of whiteness? In other words: in virtue of what two tropes belong to the same 
class/set/mereological sum that defines an ordinary property? 
 
2 Explaining Similarities 
 
One of the major difficulties that tropism faces is indeed to offer an account of the similarity between 
two tropes that allegedly belong to the same class/set/mereological sum. Suppose you have two white 
plastic spoons, both freshly out of the production line. For a tropist, the two spoons will be made out of 
two distinct tropes of white; but, the tropist also purports to claim that the two tropes belong to the same 
class/set/mereological sum: whiteness. This is because the two tropes resemble each other. Yet, if tropes 
are the only denizens of reality, the two tropes of whiteness cannot resemble in virtue of there being 
some entity – whiteness – that both share; indeed, that entity would be a universal, not a particular. In 
virtue of what, then, can the trope theorist claim that two tropes within the same class/set/mereological 
sum resemble each other? 
 
3   Primitive Resemblance Rejected 
 
3.1   Primitive Resemblance  
 
Two answers can be envisaged. One is offered by what I shall call Resemblance Particularism (RP), 
according to which similarities among the fundamental unrepeatable entities are primitive, brute facts.4 
This is a forced conclusion if one maintains (as tropists do) that the fundamental entities are unrepeatable 
yet similar. It is forced because any explanation of the similarity of fundamental entities cannot appeal to 
repeatable entities; these not being fundamental, they will have to be construed (if existent at all) in terms 
of the fundamental ones; hence, similarity would be at best explained in terms of the fundamental 
unrepeatable entities. In other words: if the only primitive entities are tropes, every ontological category 
has to either contain tropes only or contain more complex entities that are construed out of tropes. But 
each trope is unrepeatable; therefore, no two tropes can be said to be similar in virtue of their sharing 
some part or aspect. Explanations of similarity would thus ultimately be of the form: "individuals a and b 
are similar because there are a and b."  
RP has been recently defended in [Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002]. But I believe that RP is untenable. 
Rodriguez-Pereyra has the merit to rebut one of the most formidable objections to RP, put forth by 
[Russell, 1911], according to whom RP is committed to accept the existence of at least one universal – 
namely Resemblance.5 I recognize, with Rodriguez-Pereyra, that no such commitment is imposed on the 
RP defender.6  
My trouble with RP is simpler. According to RP, two things can be similar without sharing 
anything; that is, they are similar, although completely distinct. How is this possible? The defenders of 
RP teach us that to conceive ontological similarity in terms of sharing of some entity (an aspect or 
property) is wrong; similarity is a brute fact.  
Now, I concede that brute facts can (perhaps have to) be sometimes admitted in philosophical 
argumentation. But, the concession ought to be limited to evident facts, such as the fact that if a is a 
proper part of b, b cannot be a proper part of a. Yet I do not see any compelling evidence for the brutality 
                                                 
3 This picture of trope theory – usually referred to as "trope-cluster theory" – is but the most ontologically parsimonious and most 
elegant version of trope theory. Other Tropists defend versions which include individuals, universals, or both individuals and 
universals as fundamental entities alongside tropes. I will limit my discussion to trope-cluster theory because it is the only pure 
form of Tropism; the other views all resort to fundamental entities other than tropes, often to circumvent the problem I will discuss. 
For a short but fairly complete panoramic of the varieties of trope theories see [Bacon 2002].  
4 [Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002], [Rodriguez-Pereyra 2004], and [Martin 1980]. 
5 Cfr. [Russell 1940] and [Rodriguez-Pereyra 2004]. 
6 Cfr. [Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002]. 
of similarity facts. To the contrary of what RP entails, I take it to be a common opinion that to be similar 
is tantamount to share something (intrinsic or relational), as a glance at any dictionary can confirm.7  
 
3.2 Primitive Quantitative Resemblance  
 
Maybe the answer from primitive resemblance cannot be discarded so readily. There is a twist to it that 
ought to be considered. One could maintain that the resemblance among tropes defining an ordinary 
property is based on no additional fact other than the existence of each and all the relevant particular 
tropes; but, at the same time, one could deny that the resemblance is completely a brute fact.  
To illustrate this point, I will use an analogy with numbers. Under a certain conception, each number 
is particular (perhaps, is a trope8). Still, numbers can allegedly be ordered on the basis of resemblance 
facts rooted only in numbers: for example, each number in the series of natural numbers is particular; yet 
every number in the series (but one) resembles any other in that it is obtained from its predecessor by 
adding one. Moreover, numbers in this series can be compared to each other as being more or less similar 
on the basis of their distance in the series. Thus, two is more similar to four that it is to seven. More 
generally, one could claim that quantitative comparisons are grounded solely on unrepeatable entities – 
and yet they are comparisons.  
Tropes could resemble each other as two quantities resemble each other. In other words, the qualities 
of our world would be better understood as quantities. Indeed, the conception of quantities that is 
required here is the one according to which numbers are tropes. Under this twisted version of RP, then, 
tropes are quantities.  
I believe this view is not tenable for two reasons. The first has to do with the concept of ordering, 
which is supposed to account for the similarity among tropes. Indeed, orderings are relative. One comes 
before two in the series of natural numbers, but it comes after two in the reverse series of natural 
numbers. One resembles four more than seven, if we look at their proximity in the series of natural 
numbers; but one is more similar to seven than to four if we look at the amount of numbers by which 
they are divisible. Hence, the twisted version of RP renders similarity relative; thus it renders the analysis 
of ordinary properties relative, which is undesirable.  
Besides, orderings are defined on the basis of some operations or relations, such as addition or 
division. What are those if not universals? The distance between two members of a series is measured 
through a relation which is supposed to hold multiple times among different members of the series. This 
is a universal, a repeatable entity. Thus, orderings introduce universals into RP, making it a spurious 
version of tropism. 
As for the second reason, if tropes are quantities, one might wonder what the difference between 
tropism and nominalism is. Both views hold that the fundamental entities are unrepeatable, but 
traditionally tropists maintain that these entities have a qualitative character. The twisted version 
eliminates this difference, as it conceives qualities as quantities, each of which is particular, although 
they can be ordered in various ways, and compared on the basis of such ordering.  
 
4   No Similarities? 
 
The second answer rejects that there is any similarity at all among different individuals: fundamental 
entities are all unrepeatable and they are not similar. The similarity is but an experience; it is a by-
product of the way we represent the entities in question. The brownness of this shelf and of this chair 
looks the same to me. But, this is not in virtue of the fact that the shelf and the chair are identical under 
some respect; nor is it a brute fact; the similarity is a by-product of our perception of the shelf and the 
chair.9  
This does not solve the problem, however. Even granting that the entities we experience are not 
similar, what explains the similarity of our experiences? And, more importantly, on what basis can we 
conclude that our experiences are similar? There have to be some repeatable entities explaining the 
similarity; else similarity of experiences is a brute fact. Thus, the same problems affecting RP affect also 
                                                 
7 The Encarta English (North America) Dictionary, for instance, defines "similarity" as: «1. Likeness: the possession of one or more 
qualities in common. 2. Shared characteristic: a quality of feature that two or more people have in common.» 
8 See [Frege 1884], [Wright 1983], and [Lowe 1993]. 
9 This view was already popular among late medieval nominalists, such as Ockham or Buridan; see [Klima 200x: section 4.4] for a 
detailed reconstruction of their positions. For a contemporary discussion, see [Sainsbury 2005: 246-254]. 
the tropist’s explanation of similarity in terms of experiential facts. (And note that it won’t do to try and 
resist these problems by claiming that experiential facts are placed in the phenomenal world, outside of 
space-time. Even so, phenomenal experiences are entities; if similar, they will be such in virtue of their 
sharing something, or brutally.) 
The only way out to this impasse is to deny the similarity of experiences as well.10 Experiences are 
completely distinct, but we feel (or judge) that they are similar by an unavoidable deception. To my 
knowledge, this position has never been fully developed; and, perhaps, understandably so: it seems hard 
to deny that when I listen to (what is ordinarily thought of as) the same CD twice or watch twice (what is 
ordinarily thought of as) the same painting, my experiences have something in common. Also, it would 
be quite surprising if similarities were the outcome of some kind of unavoidable mistake humans are 
subject to. If it were not for such a mistake humans would not even be capable of drawing inferences, 
make plans, produce scientific theories. That is, if it were not for such a mistake, the human species 
would have probably gone extinct long ago. If perceptions of similarity rest on a mistake, it is indeed a 
very lucky one we are bound to commit. 
It is (also) for those reasons that I prefer to think otherwise than the tropist. That is, I prefer to 
believe that things are similar, that this brown shelf and this brown chair do indeed share something. And 
I refuse to leave this something unexplained, as the tropist has to do.  
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